Resumen:

En esta entrada encontraran una amplia compilación recomendaciones de bibliografía (en ingles) acerca de Epistemología Aplicada, una interesante y valiosa área de estudio, que busca conectar preguntas y problemas de la epistemología con problemas políticos y sociales de gran relevancia para nuestro tiempo. Encontraran discusiones acerca de el posible valor político de la confianza y la desconfianza, sobre instancias de tergiversación de la verdad como las Fake News, sobre los expertos y su relación con el resto de la sociedad, entre otras. En definitiva, creemos que se trata de una fructífera unión entre las reflexiones propias de la epistemología, con la riqueza de sus conceptos fundamentales, y el análisis de aquellas situaciones concretas en las cuales los seres humanos convivimos social y políticamente. Un gran iniciativa llevada a cabo por el Applied Epistemology Project @ UNC.

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Los derechos y propiedad intelectual de este índice pertenecen única y exclusivamente al centro Applied Epistemology Project @ UNC, por lo que su citación y referencia deberá redirigirse a aquella institución.

Applied Epistemology Bibliography

• Produced and maintained by the Applied Epistemology Project @ UNC
• It is impossible to be fully comprehensive, and there are surely some gaps in the coverage of this list.
• We aim to update it periodically; if you have suggestions for inclusion, please let us know here.
• Additionally, please note that many pieces cross more than one topic and consequently could have been listed under a different topic area.

Table of Contents

1. Trust, Testimony, and Deference
   1. Trust in General
   2. Expertise and Deference to Experts
   3. Scientific Testimony and Trust in Science
   4. Testimony, Deference, and Social (In)justice
      • Testimonial Injustice and the Epistemic Marginalization of the Oppressed
      • Standpoint Epistemology and Deference to the Oppressed
2. The Epistemology of Sexual Assault Allegations
3. The Epistemology of Information and the Media
   1. Misinformation and Fake News
   2. Conspiracy Theories
   3. Echo Chambers and Media Consumption
   4. The Epistemology of Journalistic Practice
   5. The Epistemology of the Internet
4. Polarization and Political Disagreement
   1. Polarization and Radicalization
   2. Partisanship
   3. Political Disagreement
   4. Persuasion
5. Epistemic Pathologies
   1. Bias and Motivated Reasoning
   2. Prejudice and (the Epistemology of) Implicit Bias
   3. (Motivated) Ignorance
   4. Closed-Mindedness (and Open-Mindedness)
6. Epistemology of the Law
7. Epistemology of Scientific Practice
8. Applied Epistemology of Education
9. Epistemic Dimensions of Free Speech Debates
10. Epistemology of Artificial Intelligence
11. General Books
    1. Applied Epistemology Books Covering a Range of Topics
    2. Collections
    3. Books for a Public Audience

 

I. Trust, Testimony, and Deference

1. Trust in General

Baier, Annette (1986). Trust and Antitrust. Ethics 96 (2):231-260.

Baghramian, Maria & Panizza, Silvia Caprioglio (forthcoming). Skepticism and the Value of Distrust. Inquiry.

Baker, Judith (1987). Trust and Rationality. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 68 (1):1-13.

Branch, T. Y. (2022). Enhanced Epistemic Trust and the Value-Free Ideal as a Social Indicator of Trust. Social Epistemology 36 (5):561-575.

Brennan, Johnny (2024). Skepticism, the Virtue of Preemptive Distrust. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 10 (2):243-260.

Buzzell, Andrew & Rini, Regina (2023). Doing Your Own Research and Other Impossible Acts of Epistemic Superheroism. Philosophical Psychology 36 (5):906-930.

Carter, J. Adam (2023). Trust and Trustworthiness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (2): 377-394.

• (2024). A Telic Theory of Trust. Oxford University

Cohen, Marc A. (2022). Trust Does Beget Trustworthiness and Also Begets Trust in Others. Social Psychology Quarterly 2 (84):189-201.

• (ed.) (2023). The Nature and Practice of Trust.

Davidson, Lacey J. & Mark Satta. (2021). Justified Social Distrust. In Vallier & Weber (eds.), Social Trust: Foundational and Philosophical Issues. Routledge.

Dutilh Novaes, Catarina (2023). The (Higher-Order) Evidential Significance of Attention and Trust. Philosophical Psychology 36 (4):792-807.

Fricker, Elizabeth (2021). Can Trust Work Epistemic Magic? Philosophical Topics 49 (2):57-82. Hardwig, John (1985). Epistemic Dependence. Journal of Philosophy 82 (7):335-349.

Hawley, Katherine (2019). How to Be Trustworthy. Oxford University Press.

Hazlett, Allan (2021). Intellectual Trust and the Marketplace of Ideas. In Alessandra Tanesini & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives.

Jones, Karen (1996). Trust as an Affective Attitude. Ethics 107 (1):4-25.

• (2012). Ethics 123 (1):61-85.

Kelp, Christoph & Simion, Mona (2023). What is Trustworthiness? Noûs 57 (3):667-683.

Krishnamurthy, Meena (2015). (White) Tyranny and the Democratic Value of Distrust. The Monist 98 (4):391-406.

McBrayer, Justin P. (2024). Caveat Auditor: Epistemic Trust and Conflicts of Interest. Social Epistemology 38(30: 290-301.

Nguyen, C. Thi (2023). Hostile Epistemology. Social Philosophy Today 39:9-32.

• (2023). Trust As an Unquestioning Oxford Studies in Epistemology 7: 214-244.

Simion, Mona & Willard-Kyle, Christopher (2024). Trust, Trustworthiness, and Obligation. Philosophical Psychology 37 (1):87-101.

Simon, Judith (ed.) (2020). The Routledge Handbook of Trust and Philosophy. Routledge.

Tam, Agnes (2021). A Case for Political Epistemic Trust. In Kevin Vallier & Michael Weber (eds.), Social Trust. pp. 220-241.

Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus (2012). Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. Oxford University Press.

 

B. Expertise and Deference to Experts

Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer (2015). The Social Virtue of Blind Deference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):545-582.

• (2016). Is There a Problem With Cognitive Outsourcing? Philosophical Issues 26 (1):7-

Almagro Holgado, Manuel & Fernández, Neftalí Villanueva (2023). Disagreeing with Experts. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (3):402-423.

Almassi, Ben (2022). Relationally Responsive Expert Trustworthiness. Social Epistemology 36 (5): 576-585.

Baghramian, Maria & Croce, Michel (2021). Experts, Public Policy and the Question of Trust. In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. Routledge.

Ballantyne, Nathan (2019). Epistemic Trespassing. Mind 128 (510):367-395.

• (2022). Novices and Expert In Ballantyne & Dunning (eds.), Reason, Bias, and Inquiry: The Crossroads of Epistemology and Psychology. Oxford University Press.

Ballantyne, Nathan, Celniker, Jared B. & Dunning, David (2024). “Do Your Own Research”. Social Epistemology 38(3): 302-317.

Barnes, Gordon (2024). The Abuse of Expertise and the Problem with Public Economics. Social Theory and Practice 50(4): 517-541..

Bokros, Sophia (2020). A Deference Model of Epistemic Authority. Synthese 198: 12041-12069.

Brennan, Johnny (2020). Can Novices Trust Themselves to Choose Trustworthy Experts? Reasons for (Reserved) Optimism. Social Epistemology 34 (3):227-240.

Brown, Rebecca C. H. (forthcoming). Deferring to Expertise whilst Maintaining Autonomy.

Episteme.

Coady, David (2006). When Experts Disagree. Episteme 3 (1-2):68-79.

• (2012). What to Believe Now: Applying Epistemology to Contemporary Issues, ch. 2. Wiley-Blackwell. Constantin, Jan & Grundmann, Thomas (2020). Epistemic Authority: Preemption through Source Sensitive Defeat. Synthese 197 (9):4109-4130.

Contessa, Gabriele (2022). Shopping for Experts. Synthese 200 (217).

Croce, Michel (2019). On What it Takes to Be an Expert. Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):1-21.

Croce, Michel (2018). Expert-Oriented Abilities vs. Novice-Oriented Abilities: An Alternative Account of Epistemic Authority. Episteme 15 (4):476-498.

Dellsén, Finnur (2021). We Owe It to Others to Think for Ourselves. In Jonathan Matheson & Kirk Lougheed (eds.), Epistemic Autonomy. Routledge.

DiPaolo, Joshua (2021). What’s Wrong with Epistemic Trespassing? Philosophical Studies 179 (1): 223-243.

Dorst, Kevin, Levinstein, Benjamin A., Salow, Bernhard, Husic, Brooke E. & Fitelson, Branden (2021). Deference Done Better. Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):99-150.

Douglas, Heather (2008). The Role of Values in Expert Reasoning, Public Affairs Quarterly 22 (1): 1-18.

Farina, Mirko, Lavazza, Andrea & Pritchard, Duncan (eds.) (2024). Expertise: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.

Goldman, Alvin I. (2001). Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):85-110.

Grundmann, Reiner (2018). The Rightful Place of Expertise. Social Epistemology 32 (6): 372-386. Grundmann, Thomas (2021). Facing Epistemic Authorities: Where Democratic Ideals and Critical

Thinking Mislead Cognition. In Sven Bernecker, Amy K. Flowerree & Thomas Grundmann (eds.), The Epistemology of Fake News. Oxford University Press.

• (2025). Experts: What are They and How Can Laypeople Identify Them? In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
• (forthcoming). Deferring to Experts and Thinking for Social Epistemology.

Guerrero, Alexander (2017). Living with Ignorance in a World of Experts. In Rik Peels (ed.), Perspectives on Ignorance from Moral and Social Philosophy. Routledge.

• (2021). A Theory of Political In Ellen Fridland & Carlotta Pavese (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Skill and Expertise. Routledge.

Hazlett, Allan (2016). The Social Value of Non-Deferential Belief. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):131-151.

Huang, Alice C.W. (forthcoming). Track Records: A Cautionary Tale. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

Huemer, Michael (2005). Is Critical Thinking Epistemically Responsible? Metaphilosophy 36 (4): 522-531.

Kappel, Klemens & Zahle, Julia (2021). In Miranda Fricker, Peter J. Graham, David Henderson & Nikolaj J.L.L. Pedersen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Routledge

Lackey, Jennifer (2013). Disagreement and Belief Dependence: Why Numbers Matter. In David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press.

• (2018). Experts and Peer Disagreement. In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
• (2021). Preemption and the Problem of the Predatory Expert. Philosophical Topics 49(2): 133-150. Lane, Devin (forthcoming). Expert Disagreement and the Duty to Philosophers’ Imprint.
• (forthcoming). Should You Defer to Individual Experts? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Lane, Melissa (2014). When the Experts are Uncertain: Scientific Knowledge and the Ethics of Democratic Judgment. Episteme 11 (1):97-118.

Levy, Neil (2022). Do Your Own Research! Synthese 200 (356).

Lillehammer, Hallvard (2021). Testimony, Deference and Value. In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. Routledge.

Matheson, Jonathan (2023). Why It’s OK Not to Think for Yourself. Routledge.

• (2024). Why Think for Yourself? Episteme 21 (1):320-

McKenna, Robin (2023). Non-Ideal Epistemology, ch. 3. Oxford University Press.

Millgram, Elijah (2015). The Great Endarkenment: Philosophy for an Age of Hyperspecialization, ch. 2. Oxford University Press.

Moore, Alfred (2017). Critical Elitism: Deliberation, Democracy, and the Problem of Expertise. Cambridge University Press.

Nguyen, C. Thi (2018). Expertise and the Fragmentation of Intellectual Autonomy. Philosophical Inquiries 6 (2):107-124.

• (2020). Cognitive Islands and Runaway Echo Chambers: Problems for Epistemic Dependence on Experts. Synthese 197 (7):2803-2821.
• (2021). Transparency is Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105(2): 331-361.

Pettigrew, Richard & Titelbaum, Michael G. (2014). Deference Done Right. Philosophers’ Imprint 14 (35).

Peter, Fabienne (2023). The Grounds of Political Legitimacy, ch. 8. Oxford University Press.

Pierson, Robert (1994). The Epistemic Authority of Expertise. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994: 398-405.

Quast, Christian (2018). Expertise: A Practical Explication. Topoi 37 (1):11-27.

• (2018). Toward a Balanced Account of Social Epistemology 32 (6):397-419. Roussos, Joe (2020). Expert Deference as a Belief Revision Schema. Synthese 199:3457-3484. Ryan, Shane (2018). Epistemic Environmentalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 43: 97-112.

Simpson,   Robert    Mark   &    Handfield,   Toby   (forthcoming).      Against  Radical      Epistemic Environmentalism (or, Why Uncritically Deferring to Experts is Still Irrationality). Episteme.

van Wietmarschen, Han (2019). Political Testimony. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 18 (1):23-45. Watson, Jamie Carlin (2019). What Experts Could Not Be. Social Epistemology 33 (1):74-87.

• (2020). Expertise: A Philosophical Introduction.
• (forthcoming). Fake Authority Country: Epistemic Responsibility and the Normativity of Social Epistemology.

Worsnip, Alex (2025). Deference to Experts. In Kurt Sylvan, Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup (eds.), A Companion to Epistemology (3rd ed.). Wiley-Blackwell.

• (forthcoming). Covert Value Judgments in Expert Testimony. In Anthony Nadler, Molly O’Rourke Friel and Doron Taussig (eds.), Trust After Post-Truth: Finding a Way Forward. University of Massachusetts

Worsnip, Alex, Lane, Devin, Pratt, Sam, Napolitano, M. Giulia, Gray, Kurt, and Greene, Jeffrey A. (forthcoming). Authority or Autonomy? Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives on Deference to Experts. Philosophical Psychology.

 

C. Scientific Testimony and Trust in Science

Almassi, Ben (2012). Climate Change, Epistemic Trust, and Expert Trustworthiness. Ethics and the Environment 17 (2):29-49.

Anderson, Elizabeth (2011). Democracy, Public Policy, and Lay Assessments of Scientific Testimony. Episteme 8 (2):144-164.

Bouchard, Frédéric (2016). The Roles of Institutional Trust and Distrust in Grounding Rational Deference to Scientific Expertise. Perspectives on Science 24 (5):582-608.

Boyd, Kenneth (2022). Trusting Scientific Experts in an Online World. Synthese 200 (1):1-31.

Boyer-Kassem, Thomas, Mayo-Wilson, Conor & Weisberg, Michael (eds.) (2017). Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge. Oxford University Press.

Brown, Mark B. (2009). Science in Democracy: Expertise, Institutions, and Representation. MIT Press. Contessa, Gabriele (2023). It Takes a Village to Trust Science: Towards a (Thoroughly) Social Approach to Public Trust in Science. Erkenntnis 88 (7):2941-2966.

• (forthcoming). Science Denial: Post-Truth or Post-Trust? Cambridge University

Corbalán, M. Inés & Terzian, Giulia (2021). Our Epistemic Duties in Scenarios of Vaccine Mistrust. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (4):613-640.

Desmond, Hugh (2022). Status Distrust of Scientific Experts. Social Epistemology 36 (5):586-600. Director, Samuel (2023). Public Health Officials Should Almost Always Tell the Truth. Journal of Applied Philosophy 40 (5):951-966.

Douglas, Heather (2021). The Role of Scientific Expertise in Democracy. In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. Routledge.

Elliott, Kevin C. (2022). A Taxonomy of Transparency in Science. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):342-355.

Elliott, Kevin C., McCright, Aaron M., Allen, Summer & Dietz, Thomas (2017). Values in Environmental Research: Citizens’ Views of Scientists Who Acknowledge Values. PLoS ONE 12 (10):e0186049.

Elliott, Kevin C. & Resnik, David B. (2014). Science, Policy, and the Transparency of Values. Environmental Health Perspectives 122 (7):647-650.

Eyal, Nir (2024). Research Ethics and Public Trust in Vaccines: The Case of COVID-19 Challenge Trials. Journal of Medical Ethics 50 (4):278-284.

Furman, Katherine (2020). On Trusting Neighbors More Than Experts: An Ebola Case Study. Frontiers in Communication 5 (23).

Gerken, Mikkel (2018). Expert Trespassing Testimony and the Ethics of Science Communication. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 49 (3):299-318.

• (2022). Scientific Testimony: Its Roles in Science and Oxford University Press.

Hicks, Daniel J. & Lobato, Emilio Jon Christopher (2022). Values Disclosures and Trust in Science: A Replication Study. Frontiers in Communication 7.

Holmen, Sebastian Jon & Kappel, Klemens (2019). Why Science Communication, and Does It Work? A Taxonomy of Science Communication Aims and a Survey of the Empirical Evidence. Frontiers in Communication 4.

Irzik, Gürol & Kurtulmus, Faik (2021). Well-Ordered Science and Public Trust in Science. Synthese 198 (Suppl 19):4731-4748.

John, Stephen (2018). Epistemic Trust and the Ethics of Science Communication: Against Transparency, Openness, Sincerity, and Honesty. Social Epistemology 32 (2): 75-87

Joshi, Hrishikesh (forthcoming). Science Communication, Paternalism, and Spillovers. Canadian Journal of Philosophy.

Kitcher, Philip (2011). Science in a Democratic Society. Prometheus Books.

Levy, Neil (2019). Due Deference to Denialism: Explaining Ordinary People’s Rejection of Established Scientific Findings. Synthese 196 (1):313-327.

Meylan, Anne & Schmidt, Sebastian (2023). Refusing the COVID-19 vaccine: What’s Wrong with That? Philosophical Psychology 36 (6):1102-1124.

Miller, Boaz (2013). When is Consensus Knowledge Based? Distinguishing Shared Knowledge from Mere Agreement. Synthese 190 (7): 1293-1316.

Oreskes, Naomi (2019). Why Trust Science? Princeton University Press.

Pamuk, Zeynep (2021). Politics and Expertise: How to Use Science in a Democratic Society. Princeton University Press.

• (2022). COVID-19 and the Paradox of Scientific Perspectives on Politics, 20 (2): 562-576.

de Ridder, Jeroen (2022). How to Trust a Scientist. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 93:11-20.

Slater, Matthew H. & Scholfield, Emily R. (2022). Trust of Science as a Public Collective Good. Philosophy of Science 89 (5):1044-1053.

Schroeder, S. Andrew (2021). Democratic Values: A Better Foundation for Public Trust in Science. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (2):545-562.

 

D. Testimony, Deference, and Social (In)justice

i)  Testimonial Injustice and the Epistemic Marginalization of the Oppressed

Barnes, Elizabeth (2023). Trust, Distrust, and ‘Medical Gaslighting’. Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3): 649-676.

Carter, J. Adam & Meehan, Daniella (2023). Trust, Distrust, and Testimonial Injustice. Educational Philosophy and Theory 55 (3):290-300.

Davis, Emmalon (2021). A Tale of Two Injustices: Epistemic Injustice in Philosophy. In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. Oxford University Press.

Dembroff, Robin & Whitcomb, Dennis (2023). Content-Focused Epistemic Injustice. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 7.

Dotson, Kristie (2011). Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing. Hypatia 26 (2): 236-257.

• (2014). Conceptualizing Epistemic Social Epistemology 28 (2):115-138.

Dular, Nicole (2017). Moral Testimony under Oppression. Journal of Social Philosophy 48 (2):212-236. Fricker, Miranda (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, esp. ch. 1. Oxford University Press.

Hawley, Katherine (2014). Partiality and Prejudice in Trusting. Synthese 191 (9): 2029-2045.

• (2017). Trust, Distrust and Epistemic In Ian James Kidd, José Medina & Gaile Pohlhaus (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice. Routledge.

Lackey, Jennifer (2022). Epistemic Reparations and the Right to Be Known. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 96:54-89.

Medina, José (2012). The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations. Oxford University Press.

Perrine, Timothy (2023). Prejudice, Harming Knowers, and Testimonial Injustice. Logos and Episteme 14 (1):53-73.

Rekers, Romina (2022). Epistemic Transitional Justice: The Recognition of Testimonial Injustice in the Context of Reproductive Rights. Redescriptions: Political Thought, Conceptual History and Feminist Theory 25 (1):65–79.

Toole, Briana (2021). What Lies Beneath: The Epistemic Roots of White Supremacy. In Michael Hannon & Elizabeth Edenberg (eds.), Political Epistemology. Oxford University Press.

 

ii)  Standpoint Epistemology and Deference to the Oppressed

Alcoff, Linda Martín (2001). On Judging Epistemic Credibility: Is Social Identity Relevant? In Nancy Tuana & Sandra Morgen (eds.). Engendering Rationalities. SUNY Press.

Dror, Lidal (2023). Is There an Epistemic Advantage to Being Oppressed? Noûs 57 (3):618-640. Dular, Nicole (2024). Standpoint Moral Epistemology: The Epistemic Advantage Thesis. Philosophical Studies 181 (8):1813-1835.

Mills, Charles W. (1988). Alternative Epistemologies. Social Theory and Practice 14: 237-263.

Saint-Croix, Catherine (2020). Privilege and Position: Formal Tools for Standpoint Epistemology. Res Philosophica 97 (4):489-524.

Táíwò, Olúfẹ́mi. (2020). Being-in-the-Room Privilege: Elite Capture and Epistemic Deference. The Philosopher, 108 (4).

Tilton, Emily & Toole, Briana (2025). Standpoint Epistemology and the Epistemology of Deference. In Kurt Sylvan Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup (eds.), A Companion to Epistemology (3rd. ed). Wiley-Blackwell.

Toole, Briana (2019). From Standpoint Epistemology to Epistemic Oppression. Hypatia 34 (4):598-618.

• (2021). Recent Work in Standpoint Analysis 81 (2):338-350.
• (2022). Demarginalizing Standpoint Episteme 19 (1):47-65.
• (2024). Standpoint Epistemology and Epistemic Peerhood: A Defense of Epistemic Journal of the American Philosophical Association 10 (3):409-426.

Wu, Jingyi (2022). Epistemic Advantage on the Margin: A Network Standpoint Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):1-23.

 

iii)  The Epistemology of Sexual Assault Allegations

Arellano, Aurora Georgina Bustos (2022). From Knowledge to Violence: The Epistemic Dimension of Sexual Violence Testimony. Estudios de Filosofía 66:289-310.

Bolinger, René Jorgensen (2021). #BelieveWomen and the Ethics of Belief. In Melissa Schwartzberg & Philip Kitcher (eds.), NOMOS LXIV: Truth and Evidence. New York University Press.

Crewe, Bianca & Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins (2021). Rape Culture and Epistemology. In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. Oxford University Press.

Ferzan, Kimberly Kessler (2021). BelieveWomen and the Presumption of Innocence: Clarifying the Questions for Law and Life. In Melissa Schwartzberg & Philip Kitcher (eds.), NOMOS LXIV: Truth and Evidence. New York University Press.

Gardiner, Georgi (2021). Banal Skepticism and the Errors of Doubt: On Ephecticism about Rape Accusations. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 45:393-421.

Hänel, Hilkje C. (2022). #MeToo and Testimonial Injustice: An Investigation of Moral and Conceptual Knowledge. Philosophy and Social Criticism 48 (6):833-859.

Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins (2020). Contextual Injustice. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 30 (1):1–30. Jackson, Debra L. (2018). “Me Too”: Epistemic Injustice and the Struggle for Recognition. Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 4 (4).

Leary, Stephanie (forthcoming). Moral Encroachment and #BelieveWomen. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 8.

Lloyd, Alexandra (2022). #MeToo & the Role of Outright Belief. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (2):181-197.

Tilton, Emily C. R. (2024). Rape Myths, Catastrophe, and Credibility. Episteme 21 (2):408-424..

 

II. The Epistemology of Information and the Media

1. Misinformation and Fake News

Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer (2023). Do We Live in a ‘Post-Truth’ Era? Political Studies 71 (2):501-517. Arielli, Emanuele (2019). The Polarized Image: Between Visual Fake News and ‘Emblematic Evidence.’ In Constantino Pereira Martins & Pedro T. Magalhães (eds.), Politics and Image. IEF.

Bergamaschi Ganapini, Marianna (2021). The Signaling Function of Sharing Fake Stories. Mind & Language, 38 (1):64-80.

Biddle, Justin B., Kidd, Ian James, and Leuschner, Anna (2017). Epistemic Corruption and Manufactured Doubt: The Case of Climate Science. Public Affairs Quarterly 31 (3): 165-187.

Blake-Turner, Christopher (forthcoming). Fake News, Relevant Alternatives, and the Degradation of Our Epistemic Environment. Inquiry.

Brennen, Bonnie (2017). Making Sense of Lies, Deceptive Propaganda, and Fake News. Journal of Media Ethics 32 (3):179-181.

Cassam, Quassim (2021). Bullshit, Post-Truth, and Propaganda. In Elizabeth Edenberg & Michael Hannon (eds.), Political Epistemology. Oxford University Press.

Croce, Michel & Piazza, Tommaso (2021). Misinformation and Intentional Deception: A Novel Account of Fake News. In Nancy E. Snow and Maria Silvia Vaccarezza (eds.), Virtues, Democracy, and Online Media: Ethical and Epistemic Issues. Routledge.

• (2023). Consuming Fake News: Can We Do Any Better? Social Epistemology 37 (2):232-241 Dentith, M R. X. (2018). What is Fake News? University of Bucharest Review 8 (1):24-34.

Dutilh Novaes, Catarina & de Ridder, Jeroen (2021). Is Fake News Old News? In Sven Bernecker, Amy K. Flowerree & Thomas Grundmann (eds.), The Epistemology of Fake News. Oxford University Press.

Fallis, Don (2015). What is Disinformation? Library Trends 63 (3):401-426.

• (2020). The Epistemic Threat of Deepfakes. Philosophy and Technology 34 (4):623-643. Fallis, Don & Mathiesen, Kay (forthcoming). Fake News is Counterfeit Inquiry.

Fraser, Rachel (2023). How to Talk Back: Hate Speech, Misinformation, and the Limits of Salience. Politics, Philosophy & Economics 22 (3):315-335.

Fritts, Megan & Cabrera, Frank (2022). Fake News and Epistemic Vice: Combating a Uniquely Noxious Market. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (3):454-475.

Gelfert, Axel (2018). Fake News: A Definition. Informal Logic 38 (1):84-117. Gibbons, Adam F. (2024). Bullshit in Politics Pays. Episteme 21 (3):1002-1022.

Goldberg, Sanford C. (2021). Fake News and Epistemic Rot; or, Why We Are All in This Together. In Sven Bernecker, Amy K. Flowerree & Thomas Grundmann (eds.), The Epistemology of Fake News. Oxford University Press.

Grundmann, Thomas (2023). Fake News: The Case for a Purely Consumer-Oriented Explication. Inquiry 66 (10): 1758-1772.

Habgood-Coote, Joshua (2019). Stop Talking about Fake News! Inquiry 62 (9-10):1033-1065.

• (2023). Deepfakes and the Epistemic Synthese 201 (103).

Hannon, Michael (2023). The Politics of Post-Truth. Critical Review 35(1-2): 40-62.

Harris, Keith Raymond (2021). Video on Demand: What Deepfakes Do and How They Harm. Synthese 199 (5-6):13373-13391.

• (2022). Real Fakes: The Epistemology of Online Misinformation. Philosophy and Technology 35 (3): 1-24.
• (2024). Higher-Order Synthese 204 (127).
• (2024). Misinformation, Content Moderation, and Epistemology: Protecting Knowledge.
• (2024). Social Evidence Tampering and the Epistemology of Content Topoi 43 (5): 1421-1431.
• (2025). Beyond Belief: On Disinformation and Erkenntnis 90 (2): 483-503.

Hyska, Megan (forthcoming). Deepfakes, Public Announcements, and Political Mobilization. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 8.

Jaster, Romy & Lanius, David (2018). What is Fake News? Versus 2 (127):207-227. Levy, Neil (2021). Bad Beliefs: Why They Happen to Good People. Oxford University Press.

McBrayer, Justin P. (2020). Beyond Fake News: Finding the Truth in a World of Misinformation. Routledge. Millar, Boyd (2021). Misinformation and the Limits of Individual Responsibility. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (12):8-21.

Mukerji, Nikil (2018). What is Fake News? Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5:923-946.

Pepp, Jessica, Michaelson, Eliot & Sterken, Rachel (2019). What’s New About Fake News? Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 16 (2).

de Ridder, Jeroen (2024). What’s So Bad about Misinformation? Inquiry 67 (9): 2956-2978.

Rini, Regina (2017). Fake News and Partisan Epistemology. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 27 (S2):43-64.

• (2020). Deepfakes and the Epistemic Philosophers’ Imprint 20 (24):1-16.

Rini, Regina & Cohen, Leah (2022). Deepfakes, Deep Harms. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 22 (2).

Ryan, Shane (2021). Fake News, Epistemic Coverage and Trust. The Political Quarterly 92 (4):606-612. Weatherall, James Owen, O’Connor, Cailin & Bruner, Justin P. (2018). How to Beat Science and

Influence People: Policymakers and Propaganda in Epistemic Networks. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (4):1157-1186.

Weatherall, James Owen & O’Connor, Cailin (ms.). Fake News! Williams, Daniel (2023). The Fake News about Fake News. Boston Review.

• (2023). Bad Beliefs: Why They Happen to Highly Intelligent, Vigilant, Devious, Self-Deceiving, Coalitional Philosophical Psychology 36 (4):819-833.

Worsnip, Alex (2022). Fake News and Epistemic Criticizability: Reflections on Croce and Piazza. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 11 (2):42-48.

• (2022). Review of Neil Levy, Bad Beliefs: Why They Happen to Good Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

 

B. Conspiracy Theories

Basham, Lee (2001). Living with the Conspiracy. Philosophical Forum 32 (3):265–280.

• (2003). Malevolent Global Journal of Social Philosophy 34 (1):91–103.

Brooks, Patrick (2023). On the Origin of Conspiracy Theories. Philosophical Studies 180:3279-3299. Brooks, Patrick & Duetz, Julia (forthcoming). Conspiracy Accusations. Inquiry.

Buenting, Joel & Taylor, Jason (2010). Conspiracy Theories and Fortuitous Data. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (4):567-578.

Cassam, Quassim (2019). Conspiracy Theories. Polity Press.

Clarke, Steve (2002). Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Theorizing. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (2):131-150.

Coady, David (2012). What to Believe Now: Applying Epistemology to Contemporary Issues, ch. 5. Wiley-Blackwell.

Dentith, M R. X. (2014). The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories. Palgrave Macmillan.

• (2019). Conspiracy Theories on the Basis of the Synthese 196 (6):2243-2261.

Dentith, M R. X. & Keeley, Brian L. (2018). The Applied Epistemology of Conspiracy Theories: An Overview. In David Coady & James Chase (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology. Routledge.

Dutilh Novaes, Catarina (forthcoming). How Conspiratorial Beliefs Spread, and How Real Conspiracies are Covered Up. Inquiry.

Greene, Richard & Robison-Greene, Rachel (eds.) (2020). Conspiracy Theories: Philosophers Connect the Dots. Open Court.

Harris, Keith (2018). What’s Epistemically Wrong with Conspiracy Theorising? Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:235-257.

• (2022). Some Problems with Synthese 200 (447).
• (2023). Conspiracy Theories, Populism, and Epistemic Autonomy. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (1):21-36.
• (2024). The Epistemology of In Luke Ritter (ed.), American Conspiracism. Routledge.
• (forthcoming). Where Conspiracy Theories Come From, What They Do, and What to Do About Inquiry.

Hawley, Katherine (2019). Conspiracy Theories, Impostor Syndrome, and Distrust. Philosophical Studies 176 (4):969-980.

Keeley, Brian L. (1999). Of Conspiracy Theories. Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):109-126.

Levy, Neil (2007). Radically Socialized Knowledge and Conspiracy Theories. Episteme 4 (2):181-192. Mittendorf, Will (2023). Conspiracy Theories and Democratic Legitimacy. Social Epistemology 37(4): 481-493.

Napolitano, M. Giulia (2021). Conspiracy Theories and Evidential Self-Insulation. In Sven Bernecker, Amy K. Flowerree & Thomas Grundmann (eds.), The Epistemology of Fake News. Oxford University Press.

Napolitano, M. Giulia & Reuter, Kevin (2021). What is a Conspiracy Theory? Erkenntnis 88 (5): 2035-2062.

Pigden, Charles (2007). Conspiracy Theories and the Conventional Wisdom. Episteme 4 (2):219-232. Poth, Nina & Dolega, Krzysztof (2023). Bayesian Belief Protection: A Study of Belief in Conspiracy Theories. Philosophical Psychology, 36 (6):1182-1207.

Räikkä, Juha (2008). On Political Conspiracy Theories. Journal of Political Philosophy 17 (2):185-201. Ross, Ryan (2023). When to Dismiss Conspiracy Theories Out of Hand. Synthese 202 (3):1-26.

• (2024). Can You Keep a Secret? BS Conspiracy Theories and the Argument from Loose Episteme 21 (2): 545-564.

Shields, Matthew (2022). Rethinking Conspiracy Theories. Synthese 200 (331).

• (2023). Conceptual Engineering, Conceptual Domination, and the Case of Conspiracy Social Epistemology 37 (4):464-480.

Sunstein, Cass R. & Vermeule, Adrian (2009). Conspiracy Theories: Causes and Cures. Journal of Political Philosophy 17 (2):202-227.

Worsnip, Alex (2021). The Skeptic and the Climate Change Skeptic. In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. Routledge.

 

C. Echo Chambers and Media Consumption

Anderson, Elizabeth (2021). Epistemic Bubbles and Authoritarian Politics. In Elizabeth Edenberg & Michael Hannon (eds.), Political Epistemology. Oxford University Press.

Avnur, Yuval (2020). What’s Wrong with the Online Echo Chamber: A Motivated Reasoning Account. Journal of Applied Philosophy 37 (4):578-593.

• (forthcoming). The Pascalian Heart in the Online Echo Oxford Studies in Epistemology 8. Begby, Endre (2024). From Belief Polarization to Echo Chambers: A Rationalizing Account. Episteme 21 (2): 519-539.

Berg, Amy (2022). Is There a Duty to Read the News? Journal of Moral Philosophy 20 (3-4):243-267. Bernecker, Sven (2021). An Epistemic Defense of News Abstinence. In Sven Bernecker, Amy K.

Flowerree & Thomas Grundmann (eds.), The Epistemology of Fake News. Oxford University Press.

Brown, Brookes (2023). Bearing Witness: The Duty of Non‐Indifference and the Case for Reading the News. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (2):368-391.

Coady, David (2024). Stop Talking about Echo Chambers and Filter Bubbles. Educational Theory 74 (1):92-107.

Elzinga, Benjamin (2022). Echo Chambers and Audio Signal Processing. Episteme, 19 (3):373-393. Fantl, Jeremy (2021). Fake News vs. Echo Chambers. Social Epistemology 35 (6):645-659.

Figdor, Carrie (2025). Doxastic Addiction and Effective Interventions. In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.

Furman, Katherine (2023). Epistemic Bunkers. Social Epistemology 37 (2): 197-207.

Gunn, Hanna (2021). Filter Bubbles, Echo Chambers, and Online Communities. In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. Routledge

Klijnman, Carline (2021). Echo Chambers, Epistemic Injustice and Anti-Intellectualism. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (6):36-45.

Lackey, Jennifer (2021). Echo Chambers, Fake News, and Social Epistemology. In Sven Bernecker, Amy K. Flowerree & Thomas Grundmann (eds.), The Epistemology of Fake News. Oxford University Press.

Levy, Neil (2021). Echoes of Covid Misinformation. Philosophical Psychology 36 (5):931-948. Millar, Boyd (2023). Epistemic Obligations of the Laity. Episteme 20 (2):232-246.

Nguyen, C. Thi (2020). Echo Chambers and Epistemic Bubbles. Episteme 17 (2):141-161.

Ranalli, Christopher & Malcolm, Finlay (forthcoming). What’s So Bad about Echo Chambers? Inquiry.

Sheeks, Meredith (2023). The Myth of the Good Epistemic Bubble. Episteme 20 (3):685-700.

Tappe, Lily & Lucas, Daniel (2022). Of Sheeple and People: Echo-Chambers, Pseudo-Experts and the Corona Crisis. Disputatio 11 (20):119-131.

Turner, Cody (forthcoming). Online Echo Chambers, Online Epistemic Bubbles, and Open-Mindedness. Episteme.

Worsnip, Alex (2019). The Obligation to Diversify One’s Sources: Against Epistemic Partisanship in the Consumption of News Media. In Carl Fox & Joe Saunders (eds.), Media Ethics: Free Speech and the Requirements of Democracy. Routledge.

 

D. Epistemology of Journalistic Practice

Figdor, Carrie (2010). Objectivity in the News: Finding a Way Forward. Journal of Mass Media Ethics 25 (1):19–33.

• (2017). (When) is Scientific Reporting Ethical? The Case for Recognizing Shared Epistemic Responsibility in Science Journalism. Frontiers in Communication 2 (3).
• (2019). Trust Me: News, Credibility Deficits, and In Joe Saunders & Carl Fox (eds.),

Media Ethics, Free Speech, and the Requirements of Democracy. Routledge.

• (2024). Science Journalism and Epistemic Virtues in Science Communication: A Defense of Sincerity, Transparency, and Honesty. Episteme 21 (4): 1434-1445.

Gerken, Mikkel (2020). How to Balance Balanced Reporting and Reliable Reporting. Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3117-3142.

Herzog, Lisa (2022). Shared Standards versus Competitive Pressures in Journalism. Journal of Applied Philosophy 39 (3):393-406.

Mohseni, Aydin, O’Connor, Cailin & Weatherall, James (2022) The Best Paper You’ll Read Today: Media Biases and the Public Understanding of Science. Philosophical Topics 50 (2):127-153.

Siegel, Susanna (2022). Salience Principles for Democracy. In Sophie Archer (ed.), Salience: A Philosophical Inquiry. Routledge.

• (forthcoming). How Should Inquiries Unfold? Lessons from Oxford Studies in Epistemology 8.

Simion, Mona (2017). Epistemic Norms and ‘He Said/She Said’ Reporting. Episteme 14 (4):413-422. Soysal, Zeynep (2019). Truth in Journalism. In James E. Katz & Kate K. Mays (eds.), Journalism and Truth in an Age of Social Media. Oxford University Press.

Watson, Lani (2018). Systematic Epistemic Rights Violations in the Media: A Brexit Case Study. Social Epistemology 32 (2):88-102.

 

E. Epistemology of the Internet

Alfano, Mark, Carter, J. Adam & Cheong, Marc (2018). Technological Seduction and Self-Radicalization. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (3):298-322.

Alfano, Mark, Ebrahimi Fard, Amir, Carter, J. Adam, Clutton, Peter & Klein, Colin (2021). Technologically Scaffolded Atypical Cognition: The Case of YouTube’s Recommended System. Synthese 199 (1):835-858.

Alfano, Mark & Sullivan, Emily (2021). Online Trust and Distrust. In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. Routledge.

Barney, Rachel (2016). [Aristotle], On Trolling. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2 (2): 193-195.

Baston, René & Kenyah-Damptey, Benedict (2020). Unintentional Trolling: How Subjects Express Their Prejudices Through Made-up Stories. Philosophy and Technology 34 (4):667-682.

Brennan, Geoffrey & Pettit, Philip. (2008). Esteem, Identifiability, and the Internet. In J. van den Hoven and J. Weckert (eds.), Information Technology and Moral Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.

Carter, J. Adam (2024). Digital Knowledge: A Philosophical Investigation. Routledge.

Carter, J. Adam & Gordon, Emma (2021). Is Searching the Internet Making Us Intellectually Arrogant? In Alessandra Tanesini & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives. Routledge.

Côté-Bouchard, Charles (2024). Should We Trust Our Feeds? Social Media, Misinformation, and the Epistemology of Tesitmony. Topoi 43 (5): 1469-1485.

Fallis, Don (2008). Toward an Epistemology of Wikipedia. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology 59 (10):1662-1674.

Frost-Arnold, Karen (2014). Trustworthiness and Truth: The Epistemic Pitfalls of Internet Accountability. Episteme 11 (1):63-81.

• (2023). Who Should We Be Online? A Social Epistemology for the Oxford University Press. Harris, Keith (2023). Liars and Trolls and Bots Online: The Problem of Fake Persons. Philosophy & Technology 36 (35).

Marin, Lavinia & Copeland, Samantha Marie (2024). Self-Trust and Critical Thinking Online: A Relational Account. Social Epistemology 38 (6): 696-708.

Miller, Boaz and Isaac Record (2013). Justified Belief in a Digital Age: On the Epistemic Implications of Secret Internet Technologies. Episteme 10: 117-134.

• (2017). Responsible   Epistemic   Technologies:   A           Social-Epistemological     Analysis           of Auto-Completed Web New Media and Society 19 (12):1945-1963.

Millar, Boyd (2019). The Information Environment and Blameworthy Beliefs. Social Epistemology 33 (6):525-537.

Munton, Jessie (forthcoming). Answering Machines: How to (Epistemically) Evaluate a Search Engine. Inquiry.

Nguyen, C. Thi (2021). How Twitter Gamifies Communication. In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. Oxford University Press.

Record, Isaac & Miller, Boaz (2022). Wrong on the Internet: Why Some Common Prescriptions for Addressing the Spread of Misinformation Online Don’t Work. Communique 105:22-27.

• (2022). People, Posts, and Platforms: Reducing the Spread of Online Toxicity by Contextualizing Content and Setting Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):1-19.

de Ridder, Jeroen (2024). Online Illusions of Understanding. Social Epistemology 38 (6):727-742..

Rini, Regina (2021). Weaponized Skepticism: An Analysis of Social Media Deception as Applied Political Epistemology. In Elizabeth Edenberg & Michael Hannon (eds.), Political Epistemology. Oxford University Press.

Watson, Jamie Carlin (2015). Filter Bubbles and the Public Use of Reason: Applying Epistemology to the Newsfeed. In Frank Scalambrino (ed.), Social Epistemology and Technology. Rowman & Littlefield.

Wright, Sarah (2021). The Virtue of Epistemic Trustworthiness and Re-Posting on Social Media. In Sven Bernecker, Amy K. Flowerree & Thomas Grundmann (eds.), The Epistemology of Fake News. Oxford University Press.

 

III. Polarization and Political Disagreement

 

1. Polarization and Radicalization

Aikin, Scott F. (2012). Poe’s Law, Group Polarization, and the Epistemology of Online Religious Discourse. Social Semiotics 22 (4).

Almagro, Manuel (2023). Political Polarization: Radicalism and Immune Beliefs. Philosophy and Social Criticism 49 (3):309-331.

Boyd, Kenneth (2023). Group Epistemology and Structural Factors in Online Group Polarization. Episteme 20 (1):57-72.

Bramson, Aaron, Grim, Patrick, Singer, Daniel J., Berger, William J., Sack, Graham, Fisher, Steven, Flocken, Carissa & Holman, Bennett (2017). Understanding Polarization: Meaning, Measures, and Model Evaluation. Philosophy of Science 84 (1):115-159.

Broncano-Berrocal, Fernando & Carter, J. Adam (eds.), The Philosophy of Group Polarization: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Psychology. Routledge.

Cassam, Quassim (2021). The Polarisation Toolkit. In Alessandra Tanesini & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives. Routledge.

• (2022). Extremism: A Philosophical Analysis.

Dellsén, Finnur (2024). Interthematic Polarization. American Philosophical Quarterly 61 (1):45-58.

DiPaolo, Joshua (2020). The Fragile Epistemology of Fanaticism. In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. Routledge.

• (2021). The Word of a Reluctant Synthese 198 (1):557-582.

Dorst, Kevin (2023). Rational Polarization. The Philosophical Review 132 (3):355-458.

Henderson, Leah & Gebharter, Alexander (2021). The Role of Source Reliability in Belief Polarisation. Synthese 199 (3-4):10253-10276.

Kelly, Thomas (2008). Disagreement, Dogmatism, and Belief Polarization. Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):611-633.

Kenyon, Tim (2014). False Polarization: Debiasing as Applied Social Epistemology. Synthese 191 (11): 2529-2547.

Kopecky, Felix (2024). Argumentation-Induced Rational Issue Polarisation. Philosophical Studies 181 (1):83-107.

Lynch, Michael P. (2021). Polarisation and the Problem of Spreading Arrogance. In Alessandra Tanesini & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives. Routledge.

McWilliams, Emily C. (2019). Evidentialism and Belief Polarization. Synthese 198 (8):7165-7196.

• (2021). Affective Polarization, Evidence, and Evidentialism. In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology.

Munroe, Wade (2024). Echo Chambers, Polarization, and “Post-Truth”: In Search of a Connection.

Philosophical Psychology 37 (8):2647-2678.

Nguyen, C. Thi. (2022). Polarization or Propaganda? Boston Review.

O’Connor, Cailin & Weatherall, James Owen (2017). Scientific Polarization. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):855-875.

Pallavicini, Josefine, Hallsson, Bjørn & Kappel, Klemens (2018). Polarization in Groups of Bayesian Agents. Synthese 198 (1):1-55.

de Ridder, Jeroen (2021). Deep Disagreements and Political Polarization. In Elizabeth Edenberg and Michael Hannon (eds), Political Epistemology. Oxford University Press.

Singer, Daniel J., Bramson, Aaron, Grim, Patrick, Holman, Bennett, Jung, Jiin, Kovaka, Karen, Ranginani, Anika & Berger, William J. (2019). Rational Social and Political Polarization. Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2243-2267.

Satta, Mark (2024). Epistemic Exhaustion and the Retention of Power. Hypatia 39 (3):510-529.

Talisse, Robert B. (2021). Problems of Polarization. In Elizabeth Edenberg and Michael Hannon (eds.), Political Epistemology. Oxford University Press.

• (2023). Depolarization Without Reconciliation. Critical Review 35 (4):426-449. Vallier, Kevin (2020). Trust in a Polarized Age. Oxford University

Weatherall, James Owen & O’Connor, Cailin (2020). Endogenous Epistemic Factionalization. Synthese 198 (Suppl 25):6179-6200.

Westfall, Mason (2024). Polarization is Epistemically Innocuous. Synthese, 204 (87).

 

B. Partisanship

Cassam, Quassim (2021). Epistemic Vices, Ideologies, and False Consciousness. In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. Routledge.

van Doorn, Maarten (2025). How Partisanship Can Moderate the Influence of Communicated Information on the Beliefs of Agents Aiming to Form True Beliefs. Social Epistemology 39 (1):24-39.

Funkhouser, Eric (2020). A Tribal Mind: Beliefs that Signal Group Identity or Commitment. Mind and Language 37 (3):444-464.

Joshi, Hrishikesh (2020). What are the Chances You’re Right about Everything? An Epistemic Challenge for Modern Partisanship. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 19 (1):36-61.

• (2022). Debunking Creedal Synthese 200 (514).
• (2022). The Epistemic Significance of Social Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (4): 396-410.

McKenna, Robin (2021). Asymmetrical Irrationality: Are Only Other People Stupid? In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. Routledge.

Millar, Boyd (forthcoming). Partisan Epistemology and Misplaced Trust. Episteme.

Ottonelli, Valeria (2021). Partisanship and Epistemic Partiality. In Nancy E. Snow and Maria Silvia Vaccarezza (eds.), Virtues, Democracy, and Online Media: Ethical and Epistemic Issues. Routledge.

Roeber, Blake (2024). Political Humility: The Limits of Knowledge in Our Partisan Political Climate. Routledge.

Stanovich, Keith E. (2021). The Irrational Attempt to Impute Irrationality to One’s Political Opponents. In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. Routledge.

Williams, Daniel (2022). Identity-Defining Beliefs on Social Media. Philosophical Topics 50 (2):41-64.

• (2022). Signaling, Commitment, and Strategic Mind & Language 37 (5):1011-1029. Woodard, Elise (forthcoming). What’s Wrong with Partisan Political Deference? Oxford Studies in Epistemology 8.

 

C. Political Disagreement

Aikin, Scott F. (2018). Deep Disagreement, the Dark Enlightenment, and the Rhetoric of the Red Pill. Journal of Applied Philosophy 36 (3):420-435.

Blanchard, Joshua (2023). The Problem of Unwelcome Epistemic Company. Episteme 20 (3):529-541. Carter, J. Adam (2018). On Behalf of Controversial View Agnosticism. European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1358-1370.

• (2021). Politics, Deep Disagreement, and In In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. Routledge.

Christensen, David (2014). Disagreement and Public Controversy. In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology. Oxford University Press.

Edenberg, Elizabeth (2021). The Problem with Disagreement on Social Media: Moral not Epistemic. In Elizabeth Edenberg and Michael Hannon (eds), Political Epistemology. Oxford University Press.

Hallsson, Bjørn G. & Kappel, Klemens (2020). Disagreement and the Division of Epistemic Labor. Synthese 197 (7):2823-2847.

Hannon, Michael (2021). Disagreement or Badmouthing? The Role of Expressive Discourse in Politics. In Elizabeth Edenberg, and Michael Hannon (eds), Political Epistemology. Oxford University Press.

Hannon, Michael and Kidd, Ian James (2024). Is Intellectual Humility Compatible with Political Conviction? Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 27 (2):211-233.

Hannon, Michael and de Ridder, Jeroen (2021). The Point of Political Belief. In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. Routledge.

Joshi, Hrishikesh (forthcoming). Zetetic Intransigence and Democratic Participation. Episteme.

Knoll, Manuel (2018). Deep Disagreements on Social and Political Justice: Their Meta-Ethical Relevance and the Need for a New Research Perspective. In Manuel Knoll, Stephen Snyder & Nurdane Şimsek (eds.), New Perspectives on Distributive Justice: Deep Disagreements, Pluralism, and the Problem of Consensus. De Gruyter.

• (2020). Deep Disagreements on Values, Justice, and Moral Issues: Towards an Ethics of Disagreement. TRAMES 24 (3):315-338.

Lackey, Jennifer (2021). When Should We Disagree about Politics? In Elizabeth Edenberg and Michael Hannon (eds.), Political Epistemology. Oxford University Press.

Lynch, Michael P. (2018). Epistemic Arrogance and the Value of Political Dissent. In Casey Rebecca Johnson (ed.), Voicing Dissent: The Ethics and Epistemology of Making Disagreement Public. Routledge.

• (2021). Political Disagreement, Arrogance, and the Pursuit of In Elizabeth Edenberg & Michael Hannon (eds.), Political Epistemology. Oxford University Press.

McGlynn, Aidan (2023). Hidden Depths: Testimonial Injustice, Deep Disagreement, and Democratic Deliberation. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (3):361-381.

Van Wietmarschen, Han (2018). Reasonable Citizens and Epistemic Peers: A Skeptical Problem for Political Liberalism. Journal of Political Philosophy, 26 (4):486-507.

Worsnip, Alex (2023). Compromising with the Uncompromising: Political Disagreement under Asymmetric Compliance. Journal of Political Philosophy, 31 (3):337-357.

 

D. Political Argument and Persuasion

Aikin, Scott F. & Talisse, Robert B. (2020). Political Argument in a Polarized Age: Reason and Democratic Life. Polity Press.

Coppock, Alexander (2022). Persuasion in Parallel: How Information Changes Minds about Politics. University of Chicago Press.

Dutilh Novaes, Catarina (2023). Can Arguments Change Minds? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 123 (2): 173-198.

Enoch, David (2017). The Masses and the Elites: Political Philosophy for the Age of Brexit, Trump, and Netanyahu. Jurisprudence 8:1-22.

Godber, Amelia & Origgi, Gloria (2023). Telling Propaganda from Legitimate Political Persuasion. Episteme 20 (3):778-97.

McKenna, Robin (2020). Persuasion and Epistemic Paternalism. In Guy Axtell & Amiel Bernal (eds.), Epistemic Paternalism: Conceptions, Justifications, and Implications. Rowman & Littlefield.

• (2021). Persuasion and Intellectual In Jonathan Matheson & Kirk Lougheed (eds.), Epistemic Autonomy. Routledge.

• (forthcoming). The Ethics and Epistemology of Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Pritchard, Duncan (forthcoming). Virtuous Arguing with Conviction and Humility. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.

• (forthcoming). Virtuous Arguing. In Silva Filho (ed.), The Epistemology of Conversation. Springer.

 

IV. Epistemic Pathologies

 

1. Bias and Motivated Reasoning

Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer (2013). Why We Cannot Rely on Ourselves for Epistemic Improvement. Philosophical Issues 23: 276-296.

Aspernäs, Julia, Erlandsson, Arvid & Nilsson, Artur (2023). Motivated Formal Reasoning: Ideological Belief Bias in Syllogistic Reasoning across Diverse Political Issues. Thinking and Reasoning 29 (1):43-69.

Avnur, Yuval & Scott-Kakures, Dion (2015). How Irrelevant Influences Bias Belief. Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):7-39.

Ballantyne, Nathan (2015). Debunking Biased Thinkers (Including Ourselves). Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):141-162.

Caddick, Zachary A. & Feist, Gregory J. (2022). When Beliefs and Evidence Collide: Psychological and Ideological Predictors of Motivated Reasoning about Climate Change. Thinking and Reasoning 28 (3):428-464.

Carter, J. Adam & McKenna, Robin (2020). Skepticism Motivated: On the Skeptical Import of Motivated Reasoning. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):702-718.

DiPaolo, Joshua & Robert Mark Simpson (2016). Indoctrination Anxiety and the Etiology of Belief. Synthese 193 (10):3079-3098.

DiPaolo, Joshua (forthcoming). I’m, Like, a Very Smart Person: On Self-Licensing and Perils of Reflection. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 8.

Ellis, Jon (2022). Motivated Reasoning and the Ethics of Belief. Philosophy Compass 17 (6):e12828. Greco, Daniel (2021). Climate Change and Cultural Cognition. In Budolfson, Mark, Tristram

McPherson, and David Plunkett (eds.), Philosophy and Climate Change. Oxford University Press. Kahan, Dan M. & Donald Braman (2006). Cultural Cognition and Public Policy. Yale Law & Policy Review 24: 147-170.

Kelly, Thomas (2022). Bias: A Philosophical Study. Oxford University Press.

Kelly, Thomas & McGrath, Sarah (2022). Bias: Some Conceptual Geography. In Ballantyne & Dunning (eds.), Reason, Bias, and Inquiry: The Crossroads of Epistemology and Psychology. Oxford University Press.

Hahn, Ulrike & Harris, Adam J. L. (2014). What Does it Mean to be Biased: Motivated Reasoning and Rationality. Psychology of Learning and Motivation 61:41-102.

Levy, Neil (2020). Suspiciously Convenient Belief. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (5): 899-913.

• (2023). Too Humble for Philosophical Studies 180 (10):3141-3160.

McKenna, Robin (2018). Irrelevant Cultural Influences on Belief. Journal of Applied Philosophy 36 (5): 755-768.

Pennycook, Gordon & Rand, David G. (2018). Lazy, not Biased: Susceptibility to Partisan Fake News is Better Explained by Lack of Reasoning than by Motivated Reasoning. Cognition 188 (C):39-50.

Williams, Daniel (2023). The Marketplace of Rationalizations. Economics and Philosophy 39 (1):99-123.

• (2023). The Case for Partisan Motivated Synthese.

Worsnip, Alex (2023). Suspiciously Convenient Beliefs and the Pathologies of (Epistemological) Ideal Theory. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 47:237-268.

 

B. Prejudice and (the Epistemology of) Implicit Bias

Antony, Louise. (2016). Bias: Friend or Foe? Reflections on Saulish Skepticism. In Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Saul (eds.) Implicit Bias and Philosophy: Volume I, Metaphysics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.

Basu, Rima (2019). The Wrongs of Racist Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 176 (9): 2497-2515.

• (2019). Radical Moral Encroachment: The Moral Stakes of Racist Philosophical Issues 29: 3-29.
• (2020). The Specter of Normative Conflict: Does Fairness Require Inaccuracy? In Erin Beeghly & Alex Madva (eds.) (2020). An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind.

Beeghly, Erin (2021). What’s Wrong with Stereotypes? The Falsity Hypothesis. Social Theory and Practice 47 (1):33-61.

Beeghly, Erin & Alex Madva (eds.) (2020). An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind. Routledge.

Begby, Endre (2013). The Epistemology of Prejudice. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):90-99.

• (2021). Prejudice: A Study in Non-Ideal Epistemology. Oxford University Press. Berger, Jacob (2020). Implicit Attitudes and Synthese 197 (3):1291-1312.

Bolinger, Renée Jorgensen (2020). The Rational Impermissibility of Accepting (Some) Racial Generalizations. Synthese 176 (6): 2415-2431.

Boncompagni, Anna (2024). Prejudice in Testimonial Justification: A Hinge Account. Episteme 21 (1): 286-303.

Brownstein, Michael & Jennifer Saul (eds.) (2016). Implicit Bias & Philosophy: Volume I, Metaphysics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.

Frost-Arnold, Karen (2016). Social Media, Trust, and the Epistemology of Prejudice. Social Epistemology 30 (5-6):513-531.

Gendler, Tamar Szabó (2011). On the Epistemic Costs of Implicit Bias. Philosophical Studies 156 (1): 33-63.

Holroyd, Jules (2020). Implicit Bias and Epistemic Vice. In Ian James Kidd, Heather Battaly & Quassim Cassam (eds.), Vice Epistemology. Routledge.

Holroyd, Jules & Puddifoot, Katherine (2019). Implicit Bias and Prejudice. In Miranda Fricker, Peter

1. Graham, David Henderson & Nikolaj J.L.L. Pedersen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Routledge.

—- (2022). Implicit Bias and Epistemic Oppression in Confronting Racism. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 8 (3):476-495.

Johnson King, Zoë (2022). Radical Internalism. Philosophical Issues 32 (1):46-64.

Leslie, Sarah-Jane (2017). The Original Sin of Cognition: Fear, Prejudice, and Generalization. Journal of Philosophy 114 (8):393-421.

Madva, Alex (2022). Shadowboxing with Social Justice Warriors. A Review of Endre Begby’s Prejudice: A Study in Non-Ideal Epistemology. Philosophical Psychology.

Madva, Alex & Brownstein, Michael (2018). Stereotypes, Prejudice, and the Taxonomy of the Implicit Social Mind. Noûs 52 (3):611-644.

Moss, Sarah (2018). Moral Encroachment. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2): 177-205. Munton, Jessie (2019). Beyond Accuracy: Epistemic Flaws with Statistical Generalizations. Philosophical Issues 29: 228-240.

—- (2022). Bias in a Biased System: Visual Perceptual Prejudice. In Ballantyne & Dunning (eds.),

Reason, Bias, and Inquiry: The Crossroads of Epistemology and Psychology. Oxford University Press.

—- (2022). Review of Endre Begby, Prejudice: A Study in Non-Ideal Epistemology. Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):1057-1061.

––– (2023). Prejudice as the Misattribution of Salience. Analytic Philosophy 64 (1):1-19.

Rettler, Lindsay & Rettler, Bradley (2020). Epistemic Duty and Implicit Bias. In Kevin McCain & Scott Stapleford (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge. pp. 125-145.

Saul, J. (2012). Skepticism and Implicit Bias. Disputatio, 5 (37): 243–263.

––– (2013). Unconscious Influences and Women in Philosophy. In Katrina Hutchison and Fiona Jenkins (eds.), Women in Philosophy: What Needs to Change? Oxford University Press.

Siegel, Susanna (2020). Bias and Perception. In Erin Beeghly & Alex Madva (eds.) (2020). An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind. Routledge.

––– (forthcoming). The Problem of Culturally Normal Belief. In Robin Celikates, Sally Haslanger & Jason Stanley (eds.), Ideology: New Essays. Oxford University Press.

Srinivasan, Amia (2020). Radical Externalism. Philosophical Review 129 (3):395-431. Woodard, Elise (ms.). Gaslighting, Implicit Bias, and Higher-Order Evidence.

 

C. (Motivated) Ignorance

Bailey, Alison (2007). Strategic Ignorance. In Shannon Sullivan and Nancy Tuana (eds.), Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance. SUNY Press.

Boyd, Kenneth (2021). Pragmatic Encroachment and Political Ignorance. In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. Routledge.

Furman, Katherine (2018). Moral Responsibility, Culpable Ignorance and Suppressed Disagreement. Social Epistemology 32 (5):287-299.

Gibbons, Adam F. (2023). Political Ignorance is Both Rational and Radical. Synthese 202 (61). Goldberg, Sanford C. (2017). Should Have Known. Synthese 194 (8):2863-2894.

Kadane, Joseph B; Schervish, Mark & Seidenfeld, Teddy (2008). Is Ignorance Bliss? Journal of Philosophy 105 (1):5-36.

Kinney, David & Bright, Liam Kofi (2023). Risk Aversion and Elite‐Group Ignorance. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):35-57.

Mason, Sharon E. (2020). Climate Science Denial as Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance. Social Epistemology 34 (5):469-477.

McWilliams, Emily (2019). Can Epistemic Virtues Help Combat Epistemologies of Ignorance? In Stacey Goguen & Benjamin Sherman (eds.), Overcoming Epistemic Injustice: Social and Psychological Perspectives. Rowman & Littlefield.

Medina, José (2012). The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations, chs. 1 & 4. Oxford University Press.

Mills, Charles W. (2007). White Ignorance. In Shannon Sullivan and Nancy Tuana, (eds.) Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, SUNY Press.

Munton, Jessie (forthcoming). All the Things I Do Not Know and Refuse to Learn. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 8.

Ortega, Mariana (2006). Being Lovingly, Knowingly Ignorant: White Feminism and Women of Color. Hypatia 21 (3): 56–74.

Pohlhaus, Jr., Gaile (2011). Wrongful Requests and Strategic Refusals to Understand. In Heidi E. Grasswick (ed.), Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science: Power in Knowledge. Springer.

• (2012). Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a Theory of Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance. Hypatia 27(4): 715-735.

Somin, Ilya (2021). Is Political Ignorance Rational? In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.),

The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. Routledge.

Tanesini, Alessandra (2016). ‘Calm Down, Dear’: Intellectual Arrogance, Silencing and Ignorance. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 90 (1):71-92.

• (2020). Ignorance, Arrogance, and Privilege: Vice Epistemology and the Epistemology of In Ian James Kidd, Heather Battaly & Quassim Cassam (eds.), Vice Epistemology. Routledge.

Williams, Daniel (2021). Motivated Ignorance, Rationality, and Democratic Politics. Synthese, 198: 7807-7827.

Yong, Xin Hui (2024). Risk, Rationality and (Information) Resistance: De-Rationalizing Elite-Group Ignorance. Erkenntnis 89: 2849-2865.

 

D. Closed-Mindedness (and Open-Mindedness)

Alsharif, Hassan & Symons, John (2019). Open-Mindedness as a Corrective Virtue. Philosophy 96 (1): 73-97.

Battaly, Heather (2018). Closed-Mindedness and Dogmatism. Episteme 15 (3):261-282.

• (2018). Can Closed-Mindedness be an Intellectual Virtue? Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84: 23-45.
• (2020). Closed-Mindedness as an Intellectual In Christoph Kelp & John Greco (eds.), Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge University Press.
• (2021). Closed-Mindedness and In Alessandra Tanesini & Michael P. Lynch (eds.),

Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives. Routledge.

Cassam, Quassim (2019). Vices of the Mind: From the Intellectual to the Political. Oxford University Press. DiPaolo, Joshua (2020). Conversion, Causes, and Closed-Mindedness. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (1):74-95.

Fantl, Jeremy (2013). A Defense of Dogmatism. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:34-57.

• (2018). The Limitations of the Open Mind. Oxford University

McCormick, Miriam Schleifer. (2024). Engaging with “Fringe” Beliefs: Why, When, and How.

Episteme 21 (4):1373-1388.

Medina, José (2012). The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations, sec. 2.3. Oxford University Press.

Peters, Katherine, Turner, Cody & Battaly, Heather (forthcoming). Intellectual Humility Without Open-Mindedness: How to Respond to Extremist Views. Episteme.

Ranalli, Chris (2022). Closed-Minded Belief and Indoctrination. American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (1): 61-80.

Vavova, Katia (2023). Open-Mindedness, Rational Confidence, and Belief Change. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 12 (2):33–44.

 

V. Epistemology of the Law

Blome-Tillmann, Michael (2015). Sensitivity, Causality, and Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):102-112.

• (2017). ‘More Likely Than Not’: Knowledge First and the Role of Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law. In J. Adam Carter, Emma Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.

Bolinger, Renée Jorgensen (2021). Explaining the Justificatory Asymmetry Between Statistical and Individualized Evidence. In Zachary Hoskins and Jon Robson (eds.), The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials. Routledge.

Buchak, Lara (2014). Belief, Credence, and Norms. Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27. Cohen, L. Jonathan (1977). The Probable and the Provable. Oxford University Press.

• (1981). Subjective Probability and the Paradox of the Gatecrasher. Arizona State Law Journal 2 (2). Enoch, David, Spectre, Levi & Fisher, Talia (2012). Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal

Value of Knowledge. Philosophy and Public Affairs 40 (3):197-224.

Fields, K. L. (2013). Toward a Bayesian Analysis of Recanted Eyewitness Identification Testimony. New York University Law Review (88).

Gardiner, Georgi (2017). In Defence of Reasonable Doubt. Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2): 221-241.

• (2019). The Reasonable and the Relevant: Legal Standards of Proof. Philosophy and Public Affairs 47 (3):288-318.
• (2019). Legal Burdens of Proof and Statistical In James Chase & David Coady (eds.),

The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology. Routledge.

• (2021). The “She Said, He Said” Paradox and the Proof In Zachary Hoskins and Jon Robson (eds.), The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials. Routledge.

Guerrero, Alexander (2015). Unexcused Reasonable Mistakes: Can the Case for Not Excusing Mistakes of Law Be Supported By the Case for Not Excusing Mistakes of Morality? Legal Theory 21 (2): 86-99.

• (2021). The Interested Expert Problem and the Epistemology of Episteme 18 (3):428-452.
• (2025). Legal Epistemology: Systems of Legal Procedure as Holistic Epistemic In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology.

Johnson King, Zoë. (2020). The Trouble with Standards of Proof. Synthese 199 (1-2):141-159.

• (2022). Sensitivity, Safety, and Synthese 200 (511).

Johnson King, Zoë and Babic, Boris (forthcoming). On the Epistemic Significance of Noise. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 8.

Jorgensen, Renée (2022). Algorithms and the Individual in Criminal Law. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):61-77.

Kotzen, Matthew (2021). Standards and Values. Philosophical Issues 31 (1):167-187.

• (2023). Conditional Relevance and Conditional Admissibility. Law and Philosophy 42 (3):237-283. Lackey, Jennifer (2021). Norms of Criminal Conviction. Philosophical Issues 31 (1):188-209.
• (2021). Eyewitness Testimony and Epistemic Noûs 56 (3):696-715.
• (2023). Criminal Testimonial Oxford University Press.

Laudan, Larry (2006). Truth, Error, and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal Epistemology. Cambridge University Press.

Littlejohn, Clayton (2020). Truth, Knowledge, and the Standard of Proof in Criminal Law. Synthese 197 (12):5253-5286.

Moss, Sarah (2023). Knowledge and Legal Proof. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 7: 176-213.

Pardo, Michael S. (2004). The Field of Evidence and the Field of Knowledge. Law and Philosophy 24 (4):321-392.

• (2010). The Gettier Problem and Legal Legal Theory 16 (1):37-57.

Pritchard, Duncan (2018). Legal Risk, Legal Evidence and the Arithmetic of Criminal Justice. Jurisprudence 9 (1):109-119.

Ross, Lewis (2021). Justice in Epistemic Gaps: The ‘Proof Paradox’ Revisited. Philosophical Issues 31 (1): 315-333.

Sarch, Alexander (2019). Criminally Ignorant: Why the Law Pretends We Know What We Don’t. Oxford University Press.

Satta, Mark (2022). Epistemic Trespassing and Expert Witness Testimony. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 22 (2): 213-238.

Schauer, Frederick. (2003). Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes. Harvard University Press.

Silva Jr., Paul (2023). Merely Statistical Evidence: When and Why It Justifies Belief. Philosophical Studies 180 (9): 2639-2664.

Smith, Jacob & Gardiner, Georgi (2021). Opacity of Character: Virtue Ethics and the Legal Admissibility of Character Evidence. Philosophical Issues 31 (1):334-354.

Smith, Martin (2018).When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction? Mind, 127 (508):1193–1218. Sorensen, Roy (2006). Future Law: Prepunishment and the Causal Theory of Verdicts. Noûs 40 (1): 166–183.

Thomson, Judith Jarvis (1986). Liability and Individualized Evidence. Law and Contemporary Problems 49 (3): 199-219.

 

VI. Epistemology of Scientific Practice

Ballantyne, Nathan & Celniker, Jared (forthcoming). No Peeking: Peer Review and Presumptive Blinding. Canadian Journal of Philosophy.

Basu, Rima (forthcoming) Against Publishing Without Belief: Fake News, Misinformation, and Perverse Publishing Incentives. In Sanford Goldberg & Mark Walker (eds.), Attitude in Philosophy. Oxford University Press.

Biddle, Justin B. (2016). Inductive Risk, Epistemic Risk, and Overdiagnosis of Disease. Perspectives on Science 24 (2):192-205.

Biddle, Justin B. & Leuschner, Anna (2015). Climate Skepticism and the Manufacture of Doubt: Can Dissent in Science be Epistemically Detrimental? European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (3): 261-278.

Bright, Liam Kofi (2021). Why Do Scientists Lie? Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 89:117-129. Bright, Liam Kofi & Heesen, Remco (2023). To Be Scientific Is To Be Communist. Social Epistemology 37 (3):249-258.

Dang, Haixin (2019). Do Collaborators in Science Need to Agree? Philosophy of Science 86 (5): 1029-1040.

Dang, Haixin & Bright, Liam Kofi (2021). Scientific Conclusions Need Not Be Accurate, Justified, or Believed by their Authors. Synthese 199:8187–8203.

DiMarco, Marina & Khalifa, Kareem (2022). Sins of Inquiry: How to Criticize Scientific Pursuits. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 92 (C):86-96.

Fazelpour, Sina and Steel, Daniel (2022). Diversity, Trust, and Conformity: A Simulation Study. Philosophy of Science 89 (2):209-231.

Friedman, Daniel & Šešelja, Dunja (2023). Scientific Disagreements, Fast Science and Higher-Order Evidence. Philosophy of Science 90 (4):937-957.

Gerken, Mikkel (2023). Trespassing Testimony in Scientific Collaboration. Mind 132 (526):505-522.

Harvard, Stephanie, Winsberg, Eric, Symons, John & Amin Adibi (2021). Value Judgments in a COVID-19 Vaccination Model: A Case Study in the Need for Public Involvement in Health-Oriented Modeling. Social Science & Medicine 286: 114323.

Heesen, Remco & Bright, Liam Kofi (2021). Is Peer Review a Good Idea? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (3):635-663.

Kummerfeld, Erich, & Zollman, Kevin J. S. (2016). Conservatism and the Scientific State of Nature.

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):1057-1076.

LaCroix, Travis, Geil, Anders, & O’Connor, Cailin (2021). The Dynamics of Retraction in Epistemic Networks. Philosophy of Science, 88(3), 415-438.

Lee, Carole J. (2022). Certified Amplification: An Emerging Scientific Norm and Ethos. Philosophy of Science, 89 (5): 1002-1012.

Lehrer, Keith & Wagner, Carl (1981). Rational Consensus in Science and Society: A Philosophical and Mathematical Study. Reidel.

O’Connor, C., Weatherall, J.O. (2020). False Beliefs and the Social Structure of Science: Some Models and Case Studies. In D.M. Allen & J.W. Howell (eds.), Groupthink in Science. Springer.

Pöyhönen, Samuli (2017). Value of Cognitive Diversity in Science. Synthese 194 (11):4519-4540.

Ridder, Jeroen (2013). Is There Epistemic Justification for Secrecy in Science? Episteme 10 (2):101-116.

• (2014). Epistemic Dependence and Collective Scientific Synthese 191 (1):37-53. Santana, Carlos (2021). Let’s Not Agree to Disagree: The Role of Strategic Disagreement in Science. Synthese 198 (S25):6159-6177.

• (2022). Why Citizen Review Might Beat Peer Review at Identifying Pursuitworthy Scientific Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 92 (C):20-26.

Weatherall, James Owen & O’Connor, Cailin (2021). Conformity in Scientific Networks. Synthese 198 (S25):1-22.

Weisberg, Michael & Muldoon, Ryan (2009). Epistemic Landscapes and the Division of Cognitive Labor. Philosophy of Science 76 (2):225-252.

Zollman, Kevin J. S. (2010). The Epistemic Benefit of Transient Diversity. Erkenntnis 72 (1):17-35. (ms.) The Scientific Ponzi Scheme.

 

 

VII. Applied Epistemology of Education

Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer. (2014). Procedural Justice and the Problem of Intellectual Deference. Episteme 11 (4):423-442.

Baehr, Jason (2013). Educating for Intellectual Virtues: From Theory to Practice. Journal of Philosophy of Education 47 (2):248-262.

• (ed.) (2016). Intellectual Virtues and Education: Essays in Applied Virtue Epistemology.
• (2021). Deep in Thought: A Practical Guide to Teaching for Intellectual Virtues. Harvard Education Press. Barzilai, Sarit, & Chinn, Clark (2018). On the Goals of Epistemic Education: Promoting Apt Epistemic Performance. Journal of the Learning Sciences 27(3): 353-389.

Basu, Rima (2024). The Challenges of Thick Diversity, Polarization, Debiasing, and Tokenization for Cross-Group Teaching: Some Critical Notes. In Eric Beerbohm & Elizabeth Beaumont (eds.), NOMOS LXVI: Civic Education in Polarized Times. New York University Press.

Brown, Étienne (2019). Civic Education in the Post-Truth Era: Intellectual Virtues and the Epistemic Threats of Social Media. In Colin Macleod & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Moral and Civic Education: Shaping Citizens and their Schools. Routledge.

Carter, J. Adam (2019). Autonomy, Cognitive Offloading, and Education. Educational Theory 68 (6):657-673.

• (2020). Cognitive Goods, Open Futures and the Epistemology of Education. Journal of Philosophy of Education 54 (2):449-466.

Croce, Michel & Pritchard, Duncan (2022). Education as the Social Cultivation of Intellectual Virtue. In Mark Alfano, Colin Klein & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), Social Virtue Epistemology. Routledge.

Goldberg, Sanford (2013). Epistemic Dependence in Testimonial Belief, in the Classroom and Beyond. Journal of Philosophy of Education 47 (2): 168-186.

Kotzee, Ben, Carter, J. Adam & Siegel, Harvey (2021). Educating for Intellectual Virtue: A Critique from Action Guidance. Episteme 18 (2):177-199.

Morton, Jennifer (2016). The Educator’s Dual Role: Expressing Ideals While Educating in Nonideal Conditions. Educational Theory 66 (3):323-339.

• (2019). The Miseducation of the Journal of Political Philosophy 29 (1):3-24.
• (2024). Can Driver’s Civic Education Model Circumvent Partisanship? In Eric Beerbohm & Elizabeth Beaumont (eds.), NOMOS LXVI: Civic Education in Polarized Times. New York University Press.
• (2024). Educational Case Studies and Speaking For Others. Educational Theory 74 (3):321-328. Peels, Rik & Pritchard, Duncan (2020). Educating for Synthese 198 (8):7949-7963.

Pritchard, Duncan (2018). Neuromedia and the Epistemology of Education. Metaphilosophy 49 (3):328-349.

• (2020). Educating for Intellectual Humility and Journal of Philosophy of Education 54 (2):398-409.
• (2022). Cultivating Intellectual In Randall Curren (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Education. Routledge.
• (2023). Educating for Virtuous Intellectual Character and Valuing Philosophies 8 (29).
• (forthcoming). Intellectually Virtuous Education and Misinformation. In Mihaela Popa-Wyatt (ed.), Vices of the Mind: MIS/DISInformation and Other Epistemic Pathologies. Cambridge University Press.
• (forthcoming). The Epistemic Goals of Education. In De Souza (ed.), Philosophy of Education for Teachers. Parents and Teachers for Excellence.

Sandoval, William A., Greene, Jeffrey A., & Bråten, Ivar. (2016). Understanding and Promoting Thinking about Knowledge: Origins, Issues, and Future Directions of Research on Epistemic Cognition. Review of Research in Education 40: 457-496.

Simpson, Robert Mark (2021). Norms of Inquiry, Student-Led Learning, and Epistemic Paternalism.

In Jonathan Matheson & Kirk Lougheed (eds.), Epistemic Autonomy. Routledge.

Tanesini, Alessandra (2021). The Mismeasure of the Self: A Study in Vice Epistemology, ch. 9. Oxford University Press.

Watson, Lani (2018). Educating for Good Questioning: a Tool for Intellectual Virtues Education. Acta Analytica 33 (3): 353-370.

Zaphir, Luke (2021). Rationality, Bias, and Prejudice: Developing Citizens’ Ability to Engage in Inquiry. Educational Philosophy and Theory 53 (11):1161-1170.

 

VIII.  Epistemic Dimensions of Free Speech Debates

Bishop, Sebastien & Simpson, Robert Mark (2025). Disagreement and Free Speech. In Maria Baghramnian, J. Adam Carter, and Rach Cosker-Rowland (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Disagreement.

Brown, Étienne (2023). Free Speech and the Legal Prohibition of Fake News. Social Theory and Practice 49 (1):29-55.

Goldman, Alvin I. & Cox, James. C (1996). Speech, Truth, and the Market for Ideas. Legal Theory 2 (1):1-32.

Joshi, Hrishikesh (2021). Why It’s OK to Speak Your Mind. Routledge. — (forthcoming). The Censor’s Burden. Noûs.

Levy, Neil (2019). No Platforming and Higher-Order Evidence, or Anti-Anti-No Platforming. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (4):487-502.

Mathiesen, Kay (2019). Fake News and the Limits of Freedom of Speech. In Carl Fox & Joe Saunders (eds.), Media Ethics: Free Speech and the Requirements of Democracy. Routledge.

Millar, Boyd (2024). Epistemic Obligations and Free Speech. Analytic Philosophy 65 (2):203-222. Peters, Uwe & Nottelman, Nicolaj (2021). Weighing the Costs: The Epistemic Dilemma of No-Platforming. Synthese 199 (3-4):7231-7253.

Simpson, Robert Mark (2013). Intellectual Agency and Responsibility for Belief in Free Speech Theory. Legal Theory 19 (3):307-330.

— (2020). The Relation Between Academic Freedom and Free Speech. Ethics 130 (3):287-319. Simpson, Robert Mark & Srinivasan, Amia (2018). No Platforming. In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Academic Freedom. Oxford University Press.

 

IX. Epistemology of Artificial Intelligence

Alvarado, Rafael & Humphreys, Paul (2017). Big Data, Thick Mediation, and Representational Opacity. New Literary History 48 (4):729–749.

Alvarado, Ramón (2023). AI as an Epistemic Technology. Science and Engineering Ethics 29 (32).

Baum, Kevin, Mantel, Susanne, Schmidt, Eva & Speith, Timo (2022). From Responsibility to Reason-Giving Explainable Artificial Intelligence. Philosophy and Technology 35 (12).

Beisbart, Claus (2021). Opacity Thought Through: On the Intransparency of Computer Simulations. Synthese 199 (3-4):11643–11666..

Biddle, Justin B. (2022). On Predicting Recidivism: Epistemic Risk, Tradeoffs, and Values in Machine Learning. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):321–341.

Boge, Florian J. (2022). Two Dimensions of Opacity and the Deep Learning Predicament. Minds and Machines 32: 43-75.

Buchholz, Oliver (2023). A Means-End Account of Explainable Artificial Intelligence. Synthese 202 (33).

Creel, Kathleen A. (2020). Transparency in Complex Computational Systems”. Philosophy of Science 87 (4):568–589.

Desai, Jules, Watson, David, Wang, Vincent, Taddeo, Mariarosaria & Floridi, Luciano (2022). The Epistemological Foundations of Data Science: a Critical Review. Synthese 200 (469).

Durán, Juan Manuel & Jongsma, Karin Rolanda (2021). Who is Afraid of Black Box Algorithms? On the Epistemological and Ethical Basis of Trust in Medical AI. Journal of Medical Ethics 47 (5): 329–335.

Durán, Juan Manuel & Formanek, Nico (2018). Grounds for Trust: Essential Epistemic Opacity and Computational Reliabilism. Minds & Machines 28: 645-666.

Erasmus, Adryan, Brunet, Tyler D., & Fisher, Eyal (2020). What is Interpretability? Philosophy & Technology 34: 833-862.

Facchini, Alessandro & Termine, Alberto (2022). Towards a Taxonomy for the Opacity of AI Systems. In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence 2021. Springer.

Fleisher, Will (2022). Understanding, Idealization, and Explainable AI. Episteme 19 (4):534–560. Freiman, Ori (2024). Analysis of Beliefs Acquired from a Conversational AI: Instruments-Based

Beliefs, Testimony-Based Beliefs, and Technology-Based Beliefs. Episteme 21 (3):1031-1047.

Grindrod, Jumbly (forthcoming). Computational Beliefs. Inquiry.

Harris, Keith (2024). AI or Your Lying Eyes: Some Shortcomings of Artificially Intelligent Deepfake Detectors. Philosophy & Technology 37 (7).

Hauswald, Rico (forthcoming). Artificial Epistemic Authorities. Social Epistemology.

Holm, Sune (2023). Statistical Evidence and Algorithmic Decision-Making. Synthese 202 (28).

Humphreys, Paul (2009). The Philosophical Novelty of Computer Simulation Methods. Synthese 169 (3):615–626.

Johnson, Gabrielle (2021). Algorithmic Bias: On the Implicit Biases of Social Technology. Synthese 198: 9941-9961.

Jongepier, Fleur & Keymolen, Esther (2022). Explanation and Agency: Exploring the Normative-Epistemic Landscape of the “Right to Explanation”. Ethics and Information Technology 24 (49).

Karaca, Koray (2021). Values and Inductive Risk in Machine Learning Modelling: The Case of Binary Classification Models”. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (102).

Keren, Arnon & Lev, Ori (2022). Informed Consent, Error and Suspending Ignorance: Providing Knowledge or Preventing Error? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (2):351-368.

Koskinen, Inkeri (2024). We Have No Satisfactory Social Epistemology of AI- Based Science. Social Epistemology 38 (4):458-475.

Krishnan, Maya (2020). Against Interpretability: a Critical Examination of the Interpretability Problem in Machine Learning. Philosophy & Technology 33 (3):487–502.

Lam, Nardi (2022). Explanations in AI as Claims of Tacit Knowledge. Minds and Machines 32 (1): 135–158.

Langer, Markus, Oster, Daniel, Speith, Timo, Hermanns, Holger, Kästner, Lena, Schmidt, Eva, Sesing, Andreas & Baum, Kevin (2021). What Do We Want from Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)? – A Stakeholder Perspective on XAI and a Conceptual Model Guiding Interdisciplinary XAI Research. Artificial Intelligence 296, 103473.

Mann, Sara (2024). Understanding via Exemplification in XAI: How Explaining Image Classification Benefits from Exemplars. AI & Society.

Mittelstadt, Brent D., Allo, Patrick, Taddeo, Mariarosaria, Wachter, Sandra & Floridi, Luciano (2016).

The Ethics of Algorithms: Mapping the Debate. Big Data & Society 3(2).

Munch, Lauritz, Bjerring, Jens Christian & Mainz, Jakob (2024). Algorithmic Decision-Making: The Right to Explanation and the Significance of Stakes. Big Data and Society 11 (1):1-12.

Nyrup, Rune & Robinson, Diana (2022). Explanatory Pragmatism: A Context-Sensitive Framework for Explainable Medical AI”. Ethics and Information Technology 24 (13).

Páez, Andrés (2009). Artificial Explanations: The Epistemological Interpretation of Explanation in AI. Synthese 170 (1): 131–146.

— (2019). The Pragmatic Turn in Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI). Minds and Machines 29 (3): 441–459.

Piedrahita, Oscar A. & Carter, J. Adam (2024). Can AI Believe? Philosophy and Technology 37 (89).

Ratti, Emanuele & Graves, Mark (2022). Explainable Machine Learning Practices: Opening Another Black Box for Reliable Medical AI. AI and Ethics 2 (4):801–814..

Rieder, Gernot & Simon, Judith (2017). Big Data: A New Empiricism and its Epistemic and Socio-Political Consequences. In Wolfgang Pietsch, Jörg Wernecke and Maximilian Ott (eds.), Berechenbarkeit der Welt? Springer.

Ross, Amber (2024). AI and the Expert; a Blueprint for the Ethical Use of Opaque AI. AI & Society 39: 925-936.

Russo, Federica, Schliesser, Eric & Wagemans, Jean (2024). Connecting Ethics and Epistemology of AI. AI & Society 39: 1585-1603.

Schmidt, Eva, Sesing-Wagenpfeil, Andreas & Köhl, Maximilian (2023). Bare Statistical Evidence and the Legitimacy of Software-Based Judicial Decisions. Synthese 201 (134).

Schneider, Susan (forthcoming). Chatbot Epistemology. Social Epistemology.

Schubbach, Arno (2021). Judging Machines: Philosophical Aspects of Deep Learning. Synthese 198 (2):1807–1827.

Simion, Mona & Kelp, Christoph (2023). Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence. Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (8).

Sullivan, Emily (2022). Understanding from Machine Learning Models. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (1):109-133.

• (2022). How Values Shape the Machine Learning Opacity Problem. In Insa Lawler, Kareem Khalifa and Elay Shech (eds.) Scientific Understanding and Representation: Modeling in the Physical Sciences.
• (2022b). Inductive Risk, Understanding, and Opaque Machine Learning Philosophy of Science 89 (5): 1065–1074.

Tsai, Cheng-hung (2020). Artificial Wisdom: a Philosophical Framework. AI & Society 35 (4): 937–944..

Vandenburgh, Jonathan (ms.). Machine Learning and Knowledge: Why Robustness Matters. Wheeler, Billy (2020). Reliabilism and the Testimony of Robots. Techné 24 (3): 332–356..

Wheeler, Gregory (2016). Machine Epistemology and Big Data. In Lee McIntyre and Alex Rosenberg (eds.) The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Social Science. Routledge

Zednik, Carlos (2021). “Solving the Black Box Problem: A Normative Framework for Explainable Artificial Intelligence. Philosophy & Technology 34: 265-288.

 

 

X. General Books

1. Applied Epistemology Books Covering a Range of Topics

Ballantyne, Nathan (2019). Knowing Our Limits. Oxford University Press.

Coady, David (2012). What to Believe Now: Applying Epistemology to Contemporary Issues. Wiley-Blackwell. Goldman, Alvin I. (1999). Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford University Press.

Herzog, Lisa (2023). Citizen Knowledge: Markets, Experts, and the Infrastructure of Democracy. Oxford University Press.

Lepoutre, Maxime (2021). Democratic Speech in Divided Times. Oxford University Press.

Traldi, Oliver (2024). Political Beliefs: An Introduction. Routledge.

Watson, Lani (2021). The Right to Know: Epistemic Rights and Why We Need Them. Routledge.

 

B. Collections

Ballantyne, Nathan & Dunning, David A. (eds.) (2022). Reason, Bias, and Inquiry: The Crossroads of Epistemology and Psychology. Oxford University Press.

Bernecker, Sven, Flowerree, Amy K., & Grundmann, Thomas (eds.) (2021). The Epistemology of Fake News. Oxford University Press.

Coady, David & Chase, James (eds.) (2019). The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology. Routledge. Edenberg, Elizabeth & Hannon, Michael (eds.) (2021). Political Epistemology. Oxford University Press. Greene, Jeffrey A., Sandoval, William A., & Bråten, Ivar (eds.) (2016). Handbook of Epistemic Cognition. Routledge.

Hannon, Michael & de Ridder, Jeroen (eds.) (2021). The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. Routledge.

Lackey, Jennifer (ed.) (2021). Applied Epistemology. Oxford University Press.

Tanesini, Alessandra & Lynch, Michael P. (eds.) (2021). Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives. Routledge.

 

C.  Books for a Public Audience

 

Aikin, Scott F. & Talisse, Robert B. (2018). Why We Argue (and How We Should). 2nd edition. Routledge.

Klein, Ezra. (2020). Why We’re Polarized. Avid Reader Press.

Lynch, Michael P. (2016). The Internet of Us: Knowing More and Understanding Less in the Age of Big Data.

WW Norton.

• (2020). Know-it-All Society: Truth and Arrogance in Political Culture. WW

Macedo, Stephen & Lee, Frances (2025). In COVID’s Wake: How Our Politics Failed Us. Princeton University Press.

McIntyre, Lee (2018). Post-Truth. MIT Press.

O’Connor, Cailin & Weatherall, James Owen (2019). The Misinformation Age: How False Beliefs Spread. Yale University Press.

Oreskes, Naomi & Conway, Erik M. (2010). Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Climate Change. Bloomsbury.

Pariser, Eli (2011). The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding From You. Penguin Books.

Rauch, Jonathan (2021). The Constitution of Knowledge: A Defense of Truth. Brookings Institution Press. Stanovich, Keith E. (2020). The Bias that Divides Us: The Science and Politics of Myside Thinking. MIT Press.

Sunstein, Cass (2009). Going to Extremes: How Like Minds Unite and Divide. Oxford University Press.